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Abstract. Cross-user data deduplication will greatly reduce the storage
cost of storage service provider. Motivated by secure data deduplication,
Abadi et al. extended the work Message-Locked Encryption (MLE) and
introduced the primitive of MLE2 with nice security properties. However, their fully randomized scheme (R-MLE2) requires the inefficient
equality-testing algorithm to identify all duplicate ciphertexts. Thus, an
interesting open problem is how to reduce the overhead of R-MLE2 and
propose an efficient construction for R-MLE2. In this paper, we introduce
a new primitive called µR-MLE2, which gives a partial positive answer to
this open problem. Our main trick is to use the client-assistant way based
on static or dynamic decision trees. The advantage gained from it is that
by interacting with clients, the server will reduce the time complexity of
deduplication equality test from linear time to efficient logarithmic time
over the whole database items.
Keywords: Deduplication, convergent encryption, message-locked encryption, interactive protocol

1

Introduction

With the rapid growing of cloud storage service, such as cloud storage [8, 9, 17],
encryption becomes an important technique for protecting the confidentiality
of data. Although data encryption provides an important guarantee over the
security and privacy of clients’ data, it limits the manners of the accessibility
and availability of the encrypted data. Thus, it is important to design efficient
scheme to support secure and efficient computation outsourcing [5, 6] and storage
outsourcing [7]. Data deduplication enables cloud data storage systems to find
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and remove duplicate data without compromising its availability. The goal of
data deduplication is to store more data in less space by storing and maintaining
files (blocks in fine-grained deduplication manner) into a single copy, where the
redundant copies of data are replaced by a reference to this copy. It means that
data deduplication storage system could reduce the storage size of u clients, who
share the same data copy m, from O(u·|m|) to O(u+|m|) if some implementationdependent constants are hidden. Also, clients do not need to upload their data
to the cloud storage server when there has been one copy stored, which will not
only greatly reduce the communication cost of clients and cloud server, but also
save the network bandwidth.
When the data from different clients is encrypted with their private secret
keys, it is difficult to conduct ciphertext data deduplication among clients. A
secure cross-client deduplication scheme should enable a storage server to detect data deduplication over the data encrypted by different clients, while efficiently prevent the practical attacks [10, 16, 19] from poor deduplication scheme.
Douceur et al. [7] proposed the first solution for secure and efficient data deduplication, and they call it convergent encryption. This idea promoted many significant applications, where various schemes [3, 12] are implemented or designed
based on convergent encryption. Recently, Bellare et al. [4] define a new primitive, Message-Locked Encryption (MLE), which brought rigor to security deduplication, and captured various security aspects of MLE. Also, they constructed
several schemes and provided some detailed analysis over them. To strengthen
the notions of security by considering plaintext distributions depend on the public parameter, Abadi et al. [1] proposed two approaches (fully random scheme
and deterministic scheme) that are secure even for lock-dependent message in
realistic. It answered the question: Can message-locked encryption be secure for
lock-dependent message? The tag randomization design makes the fully random
scheme, R-MLE2 for short, satisfy the standard secure notion of data confidentiality. Also, the overhead in the length of the ciphertext is only additive and
independent of the message length.
However, as the open problem described in [1], the R-MLE2 scheme is not
efficient in the deduplication process because of the comparison of the randomized tag introduced. It is important to maintain tags for sub-linear deduplication time, since for large data sets linear scans are prohibitive, particularly if
they involve a linear number of cryptographic operations. In this paper, we ask
whether the R-MLE2 scheme can be much more efficient (with logarithmic or
nearly logarithmic deduplication test overhead) in data deduplication for large
database while also keep the security properties of the deduplication scheme?
We adopt client-server interaction based on random decision tree, mutable tree
and self-generation tree to improve the efficiency of our schemes, and design two
(static/dynamic) efficient R-MLE2 schemes (µR-MLE2). Both of the designed
schemes support efficient data equality test while keeping the security of clients’
data by allowing a small number of interactions.
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1.1

3

Related works

Convergent encryption [7] ensures data privacy in deduplication. It is a deterministic scheme, where a ciphertext C = E(k, m) is an encryption over message
m under a message-dependent key k = h(m), where h is a cryptographic hash
function and E is a block cipher. In the deterministic scheme, identical plaintexts will be mapped to one ciphertext. When a client uploads the encrypted
plaintext to a server, the server can find the duplicate ciphertext and store only
one copy of each data. In this cross-user secure deduplication scheme, the clients
need not to coordinate their actions or consider the existence of other clients
who hold the same data copy.
Bellare et al. [4] formalized this primitive as message-locked encryption, and
explored its application in space-efficient secure outsourced storage. An MLE
scheme MLE = (P, K, E, D, T) is composed of five polynomial time algorithms.
In MLE, the parameter generation algorithm P is used to generate the public parameter. The key generation algorithm K is used to generate the message-derived
key. On inputting a key and a message the encryption algorithm E outputs the
ciphertext. The decryption algorithm D reverses the process, whose output is
used to compute the ciphertext/plaintext, and the tag generation algorithm T is
used to generate the tag of the ciphertext. In the scheme, tag generation maps
the ciphertext to a tag and identical plaintext result in one equal tag.
To enhance the security of deduplication and protect the data confidentiality,
Bellare et al. [3] showed how to protect the data confidentiality by transforming
the predictable message into an unpredictable message. In their system, a third
party called key server is introduced to generate the file tag for duplicate check.
Recently, Liu et al. [14] designed a secure deduplication scheme without additional independent servers. Li et al. [12] addressed the key management issue
in block-level deduplication by distributing these keys across multiple servers
after encrypting the files. Li et al. [13] considered the hybrid cloud architecture consisting of a public cloud and a private cloud and efficiently solved the
problem of deduplication with differential privileges. Yuan et al. [20] proposed
a deduplication system in the cloud storage to reduce the storage size of the
tags for integrity check. Recently, Bellare and Keelveedhi [2] proposed a new
primitive iMLE, which adopted interaction as a new ingredient to provide privacy for messages that are both correlated and dependent on the public system
parameters.
Abadi et al. [1] provided stronger security guarantee for secure deduplication.
The first approach was to avoid using tags that are derived deterministically from
the message. They designed a fully randomized scheme that supported equality
test over ciphertext. More precisely, there were three components in the fully
randomized scheme, namely a payload, a tag and a proof of consistency. The tag
they designed for plaintext m is computed as τ = (g r , g rh(m) ) , where g is the
generator of a bilinear group, h is a sufficient strong collision-resistant function,
and r is a randomly chosen number. Given two tags τ1 = (g1 , h1 ) and τ2 =
?

(g2 , h2 ), the equality-testing algorithm verifies e(g1 , h2 ) = e(g2 , h1 ). The second
approach was a deterministic scheme. It was made secure subject to the condition

4

T. Jiang, X.F. Chen, Q.H. Wu, J.F. Ma, W. Susilo, and W.J. Lou

where the distributions were efficiently samplable using at most q queries to the
random oracle. Thus, the security of the second approach was guaranteed by
limiting the computational power of the adversarial message distributions.
1.2

Our contributions

Building on the above insight, we make several contributions, as follows:
1. This is the first attempt to solve the open problem pointed out by [1] “the
first scheme (R-MLE2) requires a pairwise application of the equality-testing
algorithm to identify all duplicate ciphertexts”. We reduce the linear pairing
comparison times of the R-MLE2 to nearly logarithmic times.
2. By adopting client-server interaction, we construct two deduplication decision tree structures: static deduplication decision tree and dynamic deduplication decision tree. The static one is suitable for static data, while the
dynamic one, based on the self-generation tree, allows data update such as
data insertion, deletion, and modification.
3. We provide the security and theoretical performance analysis for the proposed schemes, which show that our scheme is both secure and efficient.

2
2.1

Preliminaries and Notation
Notation

The set of binary string of length n is denoted as {0, 1}n , and the set of all
finite binary strings are denoted as {0, 1}∗ . We denote the bit length of a given
binary string s as |s|. Given two binary strings s1 and s2 , the concatenation
is written as s1 ||s2 . The notation [1, n] denotes the integer set {1, ..., n} with
n ∈ N . We denote the output x of an algorithm A as x ← A. Sampling uniformly
R
random from a set X is denoted as x ← X. Also, A ← B is used to denote the
communication between two entity A and B. Throughout, λ is denoted as the
security parameter, and h(·) is modeled as hash function.
2.2

Bilinear pairings

Let G and GT be two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p, g be a
generator of G. A bilinear pairing is a map ê : G × G → GT with the following
properties:
– Bilinear: ê(ua , v b ) = ê(u, v)ab for all u, v ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z∗p
– Non-degenerate: ê(g, g) 6= 1.
– Computable: It is efficient to compute ê(u, v) for all u, v ∈ G.
2.3

Decision trees

A decision tree is a decision support tree-like model, where the decision process
walks the tree from the root. The tree nodes, correspond to partitioning rules,
are used to decide which branch to take until a leaf node is encountered.
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Fig. 1. The General Network Structure of µR-MLE2

2.4

MLE for lock-dependent message

A message-locked encryption for lock-dependent messages MLE2 [1] is a six-tuple
Π = (PPGen, KD, Enc, Dec, EQ, Valid) defined below.
– The parameter generation algorithm PPGen takes as input 1λ and returns
public parameters pp.
– The key derivation function KD takes as input public parameters pp, a message m, and outputs a message-derived key km .
– The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input public parameters pp, a message
m, and a message-derived key km . It outputs a ciphertext c.
– The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input public parameters pp, ciphertext c, and a secret key k and outputs either a message m or ⊥.
– The equality algorithm EQ takes as input public parameters pp, and two
ciphertexts c1 and c2 and outputs 1 if both ciphertexts are generated from
the same underlying message.
– The validity-test algorithm Valid takes as input public parameters pp and a
ciphertext c and outputs 1 if the ciphertext c is a valid ciphertext.

3

Security Model and Definitions

Our system consists of the clients and a cloud storage server as shown in Fig. 1.
The clients (or data owners), will outsource their encrypted data to the untrusted
cloud storage server. We consider the following models and basic properties.
Definition 1. (µR-MLE2) An efficient fully random message-locked encryption scheme with randomized tag is an eight-tuple of polynomial-time algorithms
Π = (PPGen, KeyGen, Enc, Dec, TreeInit, EQ, Valid, Dedup) run by a client and a
deduplication server.
– pp ← PPGen(1λ ): The parameter generation algorithm takes 1λ as input and
outputs the public parameter pp.
– km ← KeyGen(pp, m): The key generation algorithm takes the public parameters pp and a message m as inputs, and outputs a message-derived key km .
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– c ← Encpp (km , m): The encryption algorithm takes the public parameters pp
and the message derived key km as inputs, and returns a ciphertext c.
– m ← Decpp (km , c): The algorithm takes the public parameter pp and the
message derived key km as inputs. If the algorithm runs successfully, it will
return the plaintext m. Otherwise, it will return ⊥.
– ts ← TreeInit(1λ ): The tree initialization algorithm takes 1κ as input, and
outputs the tree state ts of the current database.
– {0, 1} ← EQpp (τ1 , τ2 ): The equality-testing algorithm takes the public parameter pp and the tags τ1 and τ2 of two ciphertexts as inputs, and outputs 1 if
the tags of the ciphertexts are generated from identical messages.
– {0, 1} ← Validpp (c): The validity-testing algorithm takes public parameters
pp and the ciphertext c as input. It outputs 1 if the ciphertext c is a valid
input and 0 otherwise.
– {0, 1} ← Deduppp (st, τ1 , τ2 ): The data deduplication algorithm takes the public parameters pp, τ1 , and tag τ2 as inputs. It returns whether a duplicate
data copy has been found.
Intuitively, with a client holding message m0 and its corresponding tag τ 0 ,
the scheme should direct to the identical data copy if a duplicate value is stored
in the storage server. We consider that the server stores a sequence of data
{c1 , ..., cn } and the corresponding tag values {τ1 , ..., τn }. The tree states evolve
after each storing (there is no duplication data copy stored in the storage server),
from ts0 to tsn , where ts0 is the initial state. We define the following properties.
Definition 2. (Correctness). A µ-RMLE2 scheme for the plaintext domain D
is correct if for all security parameter λ, tag equality test algorithm {0, 1} ←
EQpp (τi , τj ), and deduplication algorithm {0, 1} ← Deduppp (st, τ ) for all data
sequence c1 , ..., cn and tag sequence τ1 , ..., τn , for all tree states ts, we have
Deduppp (st, τi ) = Deduppp (st, τj ) for all steps, and finally get EQpp (τi , τj ) =
1 iff mi = mj .
We now define the security of our scheme, which intuitively says that the
scheme must not leak anything besides the bits for deduplication path choosing in
the deduplication test tree. The security definition is the Path-PRV-CDA2. The
definition says that an adversary cannot distinguish between two test sequences
of values as long as the sequences have the same tree path.
Path-PRV-CDA2 security game. The security game between a client and
an adversary Adv for security parameter λ proceeds as follows:
The client and the server run µR-MLE2 as constructed, the client and the
adversary engage in a number of rounds of interaction (not larger than the height
of deduplication decision tree), where the client randomly samples message from
real or rand mode.
- At round i, the client will send 1-bit path decision value to the adversary.
- With the additional bit information, the adversary conducts the Path-PRVCDA2 game, Expmode
Π,A (λ), as defined in [1] .
- The adversary outputs b.

Towards Efficient Fully Randomized Message-Locked Encryption
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We provide our secure definition of Path-PRV-CDA2 security based on the
definition PRV-CDA2 security presented in [1].
Definition 3 (Path-PRV-CDA2 security). A µR-MLE2 scheme Π is PathPRV-CDA2 secure if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, there
exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that
h
i
h
i
def
rand
Path-PRV-CAD2
AdvΠ,A
(λ) = |Pr Expreal
Π,A (λ) = 1 − Pr ExpΠ,A (λ) = 1 | ≤ negl(λ),
where for each mode ∈ {real, rand} and λ the experiment is from Expmode
Π,A (λ).
We also define the efficiency and the dynamic properties for our schemes.
Definition 4. (Efficiency) We say a µR-MLE2 scheme is efficient, if the scheme
is of asymptotically optimal over deduplication test, namely sublinear equalitytest time.
Definition 5. (Dynamic) We say a µR-MLE2 scheme is dynamic, if the scheme
can be efficiently added, deleted and changed after the initial outsourcing. 1

4

The µR-MLE2 Constructions

4.1

High-Level description

Abadi et al. [1] proposed a construction for building fully randomized messagelocked encryption scheme based on entropy-based DDH assumption. In the
scheme, the “payload” is used to store the encryption of message using some
underlying randomized encryption scheme, and the tag is generated from the
message. There is a proof of consistency, which proves that the payload and the
tag correspond to the same message. A tag for a message m is computed as
τ = (g r , g r·h(m) ). Given two tags τ1 = (g r1 , g r1 ·h(m1 ) ) and τ2 = (g r2 , g r2 ·h(m2 ) )
?

the equality algorithm verifies ê(g r1 , g r2 ·h(m2 ) ) = ê(g r2 , g r1 ·h(m1 ) ).
However, the server needs to conduct data equality test over the whole
database, which is inefficient in practical utilization. To solve this problem, we
provide an efficient scheme. The main trick is that we adopt an interactive way
to construct decision tree structures over the deduplication database, where the
client who wants to store data needs to conduct a number of interactions with
the server to verify whether the data is a duplicate copy. More precisely, the
server maintains a decision tree, which stores the storage states of the current
database. A client, who wants to store data, will interact with the server, where
the server provides the tree state and the client provides a path decision over
the decision tree in each communication round. Trivially, given the private key
h(m) and some relevant information, the client computes and sends a 1-bit path
decision to the server in each step. When there is no duplicate data stored, the
1

We assume the specific operation over the outsourced data is step by step.
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node pointer of the state tree will move a null child node of a leaf node. Then,
the server will store the data and update the decision tree state.
The first decision tree, based on which the scheme conducts data deduplication test without pairing computation, is a static tree. It means that, the
deduplication scheme based on the static deduplication decision tree is efficient.
However, it does not efficiently support the data insertion and deletion, based on
which the deduplication is difficult to support data update. Note that efficient
decision tree update is important in practical applications, we design a deduplication decision which supports efficient tree update. Our main trick is to use
a self-generation tree constructed from a public seed, where the server verifies
whether the data form is identical to the current node in the tree and returns
the result to the client then indecently provides the server which node path to
take in the next step.
4.2

The proposed µR-MLE2 schemes

In this section, we present the detail construction of our efficient randomized
MLE2 (µR-MLE2) based on the definition of fully randomized MLE2 [1]. The
scheme µR-MLE2 Π = (PPGen, KeyGen, Enc, Dec, TreeInit, EQ, Valid, Dedup) is
polynomial in the security parameter. Since our schemes are based on R-MLE2,
we omit some construction details of the algorithms in [1], and provide only the
related three algorithms as follows:
– Tree initialization algorithm ts ← TreeInit(1λ ): It initializes server state st
with static/dynamic deduplication decision tree and returns st.
– Equality-testing algorithm {0, 1} ← EQpp (τ1 , τ2 ): On input τ1 = (g1 , h1 ) ∈
?

G2 and τ2 = (g2 , h2 ) ∈ G2 , the algorithm verifies ê(g1 , h2 ) = ê(g2 , h1 ) and
outputs 1 if and only if ê(g1 , h2 ) = ê(g2 , h1 ).
– Data deduplication algorithm {0, 1} ← Deduppp (st, τ1 , τ2 ): On input the
public parameters pp, τ1 , and tag τ2 , it calls the algorithm EQ at each node
in a tree path until the leaf node if 0 ← EQ. It outputs 0 when all the EQ
test output 0. Otherwise it output 1.
We design two equality test algorithms based on the static and dynamic
deduplication decision tree, respectively.
Static deduplication decision tree. Fig. 1 provides an example about
storing m∗ based on static deduplication decision tree. A client, with message m∗ ,
wants to conduct secure deduplication. It generates the corresponding tag τ =
(g r∗ , g r∗ ·h(m∗ ) ) over message m∗ . Also, the storage server stores the deduplication
data table and maintains its corresponding deduplication decision tree.
As shown in Algorithm 1, the tag comparison query path is generated according to the data storage sequence of clients, which only allows the server to
add data at the leaf nodes. Also, it can be called client-oriented deduplication
scheme because the deduplication is conducted at the client side. We need to
remark that, the static scheme allows clients to get the detail construction of the
deduplication decision tree stored in the storage server, which allows malicious
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Algorithm 1: Equality test over static deduplication decision tree
1.1

Client←→ Server: The client asks for the deduplication of new data m∗ , and the
server returns the tag of the current node (g ri , g r0 ·h(mi ) ). (Initially, the current
node is the root of the tree and its tag is (g r0 , g r0 ·h(m0 ) ).

1.2

Client: The client computes g ri ·h(m∗ ) and verifies g ri ·h(m∗ ) = g ri ·h(mi ) .
Client−→Server: If g ri ·h(m∗ ) = g ri ·h(mi ) , the client sends “duplication find” to
the server. Otherwise, it computes b = B(g ri ·h(m∗ ) ) ∈ {0, 1} and sends b to the
server.
Server: The server moves the current pointer of the tree according to b. If b = 0,
the server moves the pointer to its left child. Otherwise, it moves the current
pointer to its right child. Then, return to step 1.1. The algorithm stops, when
the server receives “duplication find”, or when the server needs to move the
pointer to an empty node.

1.3

1.4

?

attackers to monitor the data deduplication activity of the storage server, such
as the exactly time when a new data is uploaded to the storage server.
Dynamic deduplication decision tree. Fig. 2 provides an example about
storing m∗ based on dynamic deduplication decision tree. The dynamic deduplication decision tree is a self-generation tree, where the seed s0 of the tree
is a public parameter generated by the server. The left(right) child of node
with s0b1 b2 ...bi is s0b1 b2 ...bi = h(s0b1 b2 ...bi−1 ||0)(s0b1 b2 ...bi = h(s0b1 b2 ...bi−1 ||1)). The
scheme, as shown in Algorithm 2, can be called server-oriented deduplication
scheme, where the deduplication test is conducted by the storage server. It hides
the deduplication decision tree structure stored in the storage server, which will
defeat the security problem in static deduplication scheme.

Algorithm 2: Equality test over dynamic deduplication decision tree
2.1

2.2
2.3
2.4

2.5
2.6

Client−→ Server: The client asks for the deduplication of new data m∗ and
sends the server τ = (g r∗ , g r∗ ·h(m∗ ) ) and bi . (Initially, b = −1, which means that
the current node is the root of the tree and the corresponding tag is
τ = (g r0 , g r0 ·h(m0 ) ).
Server: The server verifies whether e(g r∗ , g ri ·h(mi ) ) = e(g ri , g r∗ ·h(m∗ ) ).
Server → Client: The server returns 1 when the equation holds, and 0 otherwise.
Client: When the client receives 0 from the server, the client computes
s0b1 ···bi = h(s0b1 b2 ...bi−1 ||bi ). Then it computes bi = B(h(m)||s0b1 ···bi−1 ). (The
initial seed is s0 .)
Client →Server: The client sends bi+1 to the server.
Server: The server moves the current pointer over the tree according to bi+1 . If
bi+1 = 0, the server moves the pointer to its left child. Otherwise, it moves the
pointer to its right child. Then, go to step 2.3. The algorithm 2 stops as
described in algorithm 1.
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The tree construction relies on the self-generated hash value s0b1 ...bi in selfgeneration tree, and clients can generate the tree themselves. More precisely,
the path decision of dynamic deduplication scheme is decided according to
b = B(h(m)||s0b1 ...bi ), which is independent of data storage sequence. The complement and deletion operations are obvious. To insert a value at a certain position, firstly conduct the complement operation and move the existing data to
a leaf node. Then, insert the specified data to the current position. To delete
a node, firstly delete the current node. Then, choose an appropriate leaf node
of the deleted node and insert it to the position of the deleted node. With dynamic deduplication tree, we are able to improve the efficiency of our scheme by
conducting tree balancing as illustrated in appendix B. To further reduce the
communication round, the client could compute and send multiple bits to the
server. Also, the client could reduce some computational overhead of the hash
value generation by storing some hash elements of the self-generation tree. The
security analysis of our proposed scheme will be given in the full version of this
paper.
e(gr* , gr0h(m0 ) ) z e(gr0 gr*h(m*) )
r0

(g , g
0
r2

(g , g

r2 h ( m2 )

r0 h ( m0 )

(g , g

r4 h ( m4 )

B(h(m*) || s0) = 1

e(gr* , gr1h(m1) ) z e(gr1 gr*h(m*) )

, s00 )

0
r4

, s0 )

B(h(m*) || s01) = 0

1

( g r1 , g r1h ( m1 ) , s01 )
0

1

( g r* , g r*h ( m* ) , s010 ) ( g , g r3h ( m3 ) , s011)
r3

, s000)

Fig. 2. Dynamic Deduplication Tree

5

Performance Analysis

We provide theoretical efficiency analysis and comparison of the proposed schemes.
In appendix A, we discuss the theoretical results over our decision tree. Also.
appendix B provide the tree optimization from deduplication tree balancing.
Based on these analyzes, Table 1 and Table 2 illustrate the comparison among
the three schemes in terms of both asymptotic computation and communication complexity and actual execution time. In our computation analysis, Hash
denotes hash operation mapping a bit-string to a designed length value, Mul
denotes a multiplication operation, Exp denotes the exponentiation operation
in G, and Pair denotes the pairing operation. In our communication analysis,
we consider the bit-length of the content that needed to transfer between the
client and the server. In our analysis, SND and RCV denote the overhead of
sending and receiving a message with a certain length respectively.
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Table 1. Computation Overhead of Data Deduplication
We omit lightweight string comparison overhead and some common computational overhead among
the three scheme such as key generation, data encryption and validity testing.

Scheme
Client
Server
R-MLE2
2Exp + Mul + Hash
2Pair · O(n)
µR-MLE2 (Static) 2Exp + Mul + Hash + (Exp + Hash) · O(h)
∅
µR-MLE2 (Dynamic)
2Exp + Mul + Hash + (2Hash) · O(h)
2Pair · O(h)

As shown in Table 1 and Table 2, the client needs to conduct one-time tag
generation and transmission. Then, the server will use pairing computation over
the whole database to realize the equality test. More precisely, the computation
and communication overhead of the server are O(1) and O(n), respectively.
The scheme based on static deduplication decision tree needs to fetch the tags
in the path of deduplication decision tree and verify whether there is a duplicate
copy of data stored in the server. Then, it sends a 1-bit path decision information
to the server for choosing the path over the deduplication decision tree. The
server just provides the tag values for the client according to the 1-bit path
decision information each time. Since the static scheme is client side equality
test, it does not need the expensive pairing computation. Instead, compared
with the dynamic scheme, the scheme based on the static one needs much more
communication overhead in each communication round.
The scheme based on dynamic deduplication decision tree, will greatly reduce
both the communication and computation over of the client. More precisely, the
client will only compute the path decision bit with the seeds of self-generation
tree and send it to the server each time. The server will conduct the expensive
equality test based on bilinear pairing. The maximum communication rounds of
our schemes are decided by the deduplication decision tree height h, while not
the whole data items n stored in the server. Actually, with the self-generation
tree, the client could send multiple bits to help the server to conduct path decision each time, which will further reduce the communication rounds of the
scheme. Compared with the scheme based on static deduplication decision tree,
the client conducts lightweight hash operations and leaves the expensive pairing
computation to the server.
Remark 1. The maximum equality test times of our schemes are the height of
the deduplication decision tree. According to the theoretical analysis of the deduplication decision tree height in the appendix A, our scheme is efficient. As the
tree updating and the tree balancing discussion in the appendix B, it is obvious
that the scheme based on the dynamic deduplication decision tree is a dynamic
scheme. For data deletion, the server could directly delete the relation between
the deduplication decision tree and the data item. For data insertion, if a node
is empty, the server will just insert the data. Otherwise, the data owner need
help the server to move the data to a leaf node of the tree according to the
deduplication policy and then insert the data element to the designed node.
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Table 2. Data Deduplication Communication Overhead

We omit the ciphertext uploading overhead among the three scheme. We do not provide the
communication overhead of the server, because the communication content between the server and
client is asymmetric. The server-side communication overhead is SND(RCV), when the client-side
communication overhead is RCV(SND).
?
x = |g r | + |g r·h(m) | + O(h) and y = (|g r | + |g r·h(m) |)O(h) and 1 ≤ x ≤ h.

Scheme
R-MLE2
µR-MLE2 (Static)
µR-MLE2 (Dynamic)

6

Communication bits (Client) Communication rounds
SND(|g r | + |g r·h(m) |)
SND(x) + RCV(y) ?
SND(x) + RCV(O(h))?

O(1)
O(h)
O(h)

Conclusion

We explore intractive avenues to extentd the efficiency of fully randomized secure
deduplication scheme. We construct two interactive schemes based on static and
dynamic deduplication decision tree structures, respectively. The scheme based
on the static deduplication decision tree does not allow the tree to update, while
the scheme the dynamic deduplication decision tree is constructed based on the
designed self-generation tree, which allows the server to conduct tree update and
some other optimization such as tree balancing based on deduplication access
frequency of the user. We also provide the security and performance analysis
of our scheme, which show that our scheme is Path-PRV-CDA2 secure and it
achieves several orders of magnitude higher performance than the state-of-theart scheme in practical data deduplication.
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Appendix A

Tree Height

Most operations on a deduplication decision tree take time directly proportional
to the height of the tree, so it is desirable to keep the height small. A binary
tree with height h can contain at most 2h+1 − 1 nodes. It follows that for a tree
with n nodes and height h where h ≥ blog2n c.
We model the hash function as random oracle in this paper. Since the input
g r·h(m) each time is random in our first deduplication decision tree construction,
we consider g r·h(m) as a random bit-string. Then, we also consider b = B(g r·h(m) )
as random bit.
In the self-generation binary tree, we consider the adopted hash function from
a family of hash functions which maps the value of each key from some universe
1
.
U into m. H = h : U → [m], where ∀x, y ∈ U, x 6= y : P r [h(x) = h(y)] ≤ m
h∈H

Then, we can model the values in the self-generation tree as random values.
Finally, we model b = B(s||h(m)) as random bit.
The two deduplication decision trees constructed are similar to the random
binary trees widely studied to provide information useful in evaluating algorithms based on this storage structure. We model the hash value as the random
input and adopt the compressed binary b to make path decision.
If we construct a binary search tree from a sequence of n different numbers
by inserting them in the random order into an initially empty tree as shown in
our two constructions. Let Hn be the height of the constructed tree on n nodes.
As n approaches ∞, there exists constants α = 4.311... and β = 1.953..., such
that the expected value E(Hn ) = αlnn − βlnlnn + O(1), and the variety of Hn
is V ar(Hn ) = O(1) [18]. Here, ln is the natural logarithm and log is the base
2 logarithm. The expect height of the two deduplication decision trees are of
logarithmic equality-testing time, which means that our schemes are efficient.

Appendix B

Deduplication Decision Tree Balancing

An optimal binary search tree (BST) is usually used to provide the smallest
possible search time for a given sequence of accesses. We consider the server
side optimization over our dynamic deduplication decision tree, because it could
gradually collect and record the deduplication access frequency of all the elements stored in the database. Actually, it is not practical for us to conduct tree
balancing over the static deduplication decision tree, because we can not predict
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the storing sequence and frequency affect the structure of deduplication decision
tree. Also, all the first data owners relevant to the node’s children need to take
part into the tree balancing procedure in static scheme. Thus, we just consider
tree balancing of dynamic scheme, where the tree can be modified at any time,
typically by permitting tree rotations.
By generalizing the problem, we consider not only the frequencies with which
a successful search is completed, but also the frequencies where unsuccessful
searches occur. In our deduplication three, we consider there
P are nPelements
B1 , ..., Bn and 2n + 1 frequencies β1 , ..., βn , α1 , ..., αn with
βi +
αj = 1,
where βi is the frequency of encountering element Bi , and αj is the frequency of
encountering an element which lies between Bj and Bj+1 as defined in [11]. In
the dynamic deduplication decision tree with n interior nodes and n + 1 leaves,
as defined in [15], the weighted path length of the tree is
P =

n
X

βi (bi + 1) +

i=1

Let n = 2k − 1, βi = 2−k + εi , with

n
X

αj aj .

(1)

j=0
n
X

εi = 2−k and ε1 > ε2 > · · · > εn > 0

i=1

for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and αj = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. In a balanced tree for the above
frequency distribution, as shown in [15], its weighted path length is
P ≤ 2−(k−1)

n
n
X
X
(bi + 1) ≤ 2−(k−1) 2(l−1) · l ≤ 2 · logn.
i=1

(2)

i=1

If we get βi > βj where βi is the frequency of encountering element Bi and
βj is the frequency of Bi ’s child node Bj . We get the weighted path length sum
of the two node is P . We exchange the position of element Bi and Bj , the sum
of the weighted path length of the two node is P 0 . Since the distance of node Bi
from the root is always smaller than that of its children, we have bi < bj . Then,
we get
P − P 0 = βi (bi + 1) + βj (bj + 1) − βi (bj + 1) − βj (bi + 1)
= (βi − βj )(bi − bj ) < 0

(3)

Equation 3 shows that we will get smaller weighted path length, if we move
the element with larger frequency closer to the root. Thus, the server will be
able to optimize the tree structure by moving element closer to the root in our
scheme based on dynamic deduplication decision tree.

